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Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has 
emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (e.g., a national government) may coerce 
the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (e.g., state governments and other organizations 
whose activities are governed by the federal government). We observe that an actor’s power 
alone may be sufficient to promote reform, regardless of the actor’s legitimacy. However, such 
reforms are more susceptible to subsequent change than are those that emerge from processes not 
subject to the influence of external actors whose sway derives from their power alone. We 
develop and test our arguments in the context of the worldwide electricity provision industry by 
analyzing countries’ adoption of reforms in response to conditional lending practices by 
multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. We find that reforms adopted in 
response to coercive pressures exerted by these organizations encounter much greater resistance, 
and that the incidence of financial and economic crises, the absence of checks and balances in 
established political institutions, and the inexperience of investor coalitions dramatically increase 
the predicted level of resistance.   1
1 Introduction 
Political actors that coerce dependent actors to undertake institutional change are often 
assumed to succeed on account of both their power and legitimacy.
1 Accordingly, reforms (of 
policies or practices) adopted in response to legal coercive influences (such as reforms adopted 
by state governments in response to pressure from the central government) are often assumed to 
enjoy an initial positive evaluation by actors in the adopting organization, which confers 
“morally-based” legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) on these elements and allows them to survive for a 
sufficiently long period to undergo the process of institutionalization and attain “cognitively-
based legitimacy” (or “taken-for-grantedness” (Suchman, 1995)). 
Legitimacy is not, however, a necessary precondition for effective coercion; power alone 
is sufficient (Weber, 1978; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Powerful actors may therefore be 
considered illegitimate by the dependent actors that they coerce to adopt reforms, and reforms 
adopted in response to coercion by such actors may thus be deemed illegitimate, increasing the 
probability that actors in society will resist their adoption and institutionalization (Weber, 1978: 
33-38).  
A substantial body of work has considered how coercive pressures may generate the 
formal adoption of a reform but a decoupling of the actual behavior of actors from the “myth and 
ceremony” of compliance with the letter of that reform (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Westphal, 
Gulati, and Shortell, 1997; Staw and Epstein, 2000). In contrast, only two smaller bodies of work 
consider, as we do, the determinants of resistance to formal adoption that at least initially 
generates changes in actual behavior. The literatures on social movements (Barkan, 1984; 
                                                 
1 For important exceptions, see Stryker’s (1994) examination of the impact of the introduction of science 
into law on the legitimacy of law and Patashnik’s (2003) qualitative study of policy-feedback effects.   2
Griffin, E., and Rubin, 1986; Kerbo and Shaffer, 1992) and procedural justice (Tyler, Rasinski, 
and McGraw, 1985; Tyler, 1994) have considered the mechanisms that individuals (or interest 
groups representing like-minded individuals) use to resist reforms adopted primarily due to the 
influence of powerful external actors who lack legitimacy. We build on these micro-level studies 
by using neoinstitutional theory to analyze the conditions under which macro-level (i.e., country- 
or organization-level) reforms adopted in response to such influence are likely to face resistance 
that threatens their survival. 
We consider the specific context of reforms intended to transfer (some portion of) 
ownership, control and operation of state-owned assets to private (and often foreign) 
corporations, in response to the influence of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and other multilateral lenders. While  92 countries adopted such reforms in1985-1999, resulting 
in the transfer of over one trillion dollars of assets to private ownership (in 60 countries transfers 
accounted for more than 5 percent of gross domestic product) (Brune, Garrett, and Kogut, 2004; 
Kogut and Macpherson, 2004a), these countries frequently encountered substantial resistance 
both at the time of reform adoption (Walton and Ragin, 1990) and subsequently (Henisz and 
Zelner, 2005).  
Organized domestic interest groups that are adversely affected by market-oriented 
reforms initiate such resistance and, in an effort to capture policymakers’ limited attention 
(Kingdon, 1984), attempt to mobilize broader segments of society by framing the reforms as 
foreign and illegitimate (Henisz and Zelner, 2005). The ultimate target of such resistance is the 
repeal of the reforms. However, disaffected interest groups often initially target narrow elements 
of the reform or specific investors whose activities are governed by such reforms, and 
governments may respond by reversing elements of the reform or with adverse actions against   3
only certain investors (or inaction by failing to honor policy terms) as well as across-the-board 
policy revision or repeal.  
Several conditions affect the incidence and success of resistance efforts. Resistance 
increases dramatically in periods of financial or macroeconomic crisis, when disaffected interest 
groups can frame current events as evidence of the adverse distributive consequences of market-
oriented reforms. In contrast, resistance diminishes with both time (Oliver, 1991) and the level of 
checks and balances in a country’s established political institutions (Henisz and Zelner, 2005). 
The efficacy of resistance efforts faced by individual investor coalitions can also vary: more 
experienced coalitions, or those that have greater influence over domestic policymakers, may be 
better able to avoid inimical policy changes and government disputes in the first place.   
Our findings contribute to the literature on institutional change by empirically identifying 
the conditions under which external coercion generates reforms that eventually become 
institutionalized, and those conditions under which such reforms face sufficient resistance to 
undermine their stability. They also contribute to the burgeoning literature on the efficacy of 
multilateral lenders’ “conditionality” policies, which require borrowing countries to adopt 
market-oriented reforms. While the World Bank and International Monetary Fund are 
increasingly aware of the importance of politics as well as economics for the success of their 
lending programs, our theoretical arguments about the determinants of resistance and empirical 
results that support them suggest that multilateral lenders should place greater weight on 
neoinstitutional theory broadly defined. 
2  Institutions: Established and Emergent 
According to the neoinstitutional perspective in organization theory, an institution’s 
defining characteristic is “legitimacy” attained on “cognitive” grounds. Legitimacy refers to “the   4
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” 
(Suchman, 1995: 574). “Cognitively-based legitimacy” (Suchman, 1995: 579-81) derives from 
an entity’s widespread, implicit acceptance—propriety by assumption—resulting from the long-
term process of “institutionalization” (Zucker, 1987).  
Members of society do not actively assess institutions, which have come to possess “a 
reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact” 
(Berger and Luckman, 1967). This “taken-for-grantedness” imbues institutions with high 
resistance to change (Zucker, 1977); indeed, an institution’s very “essence” is one of 
“permanence” (Suchman, 1995: 584). 
Reforms adopted in response to multilateral influence necessarily lack cognitively-based 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995: 582) because the social process of institutionalization is a lengthy 
one. Accordingly, investors operating whose activities are governed by such newly introduced 
policies and organizational entities are likely to encounter greater resistance than are their 
counterparts whose activities are governed by policies and organizational entities deemed 
legitimate. In order to distinguish these two classes of governance structures, we subsequently 
refer to the former as “emergent institutions” and the latter as “established institutions.”  
Unlike established institutions, whose consequences, procedures and structural type 
(Suchman, 1995: 579-81) are largely beyond normative evaluation, emergent institutions’ 
consequences, procedures and structural type are explicitly subject to such evaluation by actors 
in society. If positive, this evaluation may imbue an emergent institution with “morally-based” 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995: 579-81) and consequently decrease the resistance faced by investors 
operating under that institution; a  negative evaluation, in contrast, may trigger resistance.   5
In the case of emergent regulative institutions, the mechanisms of resistance operate 
through the policymaking process, wherein interest groups that vary in their level of organization 
(Olson, 1965; Lowi, 1969; Wilson, 1980; Denzau and Munger, 1986) attempt to influence 
political actors seeking to retain office (Kingdon, 1984; Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991) within the 
constraints imposed by a formal policymaking structure (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1980; Weingast, 
1981; Weingast and Moran, 1983; McNollGast, 1987; Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Tsebelis, 
2003). The primary agents of change are the organized interest groups (Olson, 1965; Stigler, 
1975; Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983) that are most dissatisfied with how the emergent institution 
accommodates their interests (Holm, 1995; Sjöstrand, 1995; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Seo 
and Creed, 2002), and the most common source of dissatisfaction is the emergent institution’s 
distributional consequences (March and Simon, 1958).   
Because these primary change agents are often insufficiently powerful on their own to 
move the issue of change onto the limited policymaking agenda (Kingdon, 1984; Hilgartner and 
Bosk, 1988), they attempt to enlist the support of a broad range of “secondary” groups—other 
organized interest groups and diffuse, unorganized groups whose members are either marginally 
affected or unaffected by the emergent institution—that together are capable of capturing 
policymakers’ limited attention (Lipsky, 1968; Schumaker, 1975; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; 
Denzau and Munger, 1986; Baumgartner, 2002; Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2002). The core 
techniques that primary change agents use to mobilize secondary groups revolve around 
“framing” (Benford and Snow, 2000) the emergent institution’s consequences, procedures or 
structural type (Suchman, 1995: 579-81) as conflicting with pre-existing “cultural 
preoccupations and political biases” (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988: 63; McFarland, 1991).   6
3  Resistance to Emergent Institutions 
3.1 Foreign  Coercion 
A substantial body of work argues that a powerful, legitimate actor’s sanction of an 
emergent institution facilitates its adoption by dependent actors (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983),
2 but  
the issue of the resistance to the emergent institution’s adoption has received considerably less  
attention. Tolbert and Zucker (1983) write that new elements of formal structure,  
“…once legitimated by higher level organizations, through legal mandate or other formal 
means, [are rapidly incorporated by] dependent organizations. This adoption is seldom 
problematic when the elements have high face validity and there is common agreement 
concerning their overall utility. However, under certain conditions, strong resistance can 
develop." (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983: 27) 
                                                 
2 The early studies examining the role of such external actors on the adoption of new formal institutional 
structures focused on the public sector. For example, building on (Benson, 1975; Rowan, 1982) argues that where 
the outcome of the process of policymaking among state-level legislatures, regulatory agencies and interest groups 
reflects a state of “balance” or consensus, local-level public sector actors are more likely to adopt and retain newly 
introduced state-level formal structures. Tolbert and Zucker (1983) find more rapid adoption of civil service 
procedures by cities in American states that mandated them and that directed the process through a single 
administrative source. Westney (1987) highlights the role of the Japanese state in the Meiji period in diffusing 
organizational models through that country’s public sector. Later work demonstrated that similar coercive pressures 
may be generated by the state on private actors (Cole, 1985; Singh, Tucker, and House, 1986; Baron, Jennings, and 
Dobbin, 1988; Edelman, 1990; Baum and Oliver, 1992; Dobbin, et al., 1993; Dobbin, 1994; Sutton and Dobbin, 
1996; Ruef and Scott, 1998; Strang and Bradburn, 2001; Simons and Ingram, 2003), by informal institutional 
pressures on private sector actors (Dacin, 1997) or by higher-level private actors on their lower-level counterparts 
(Levitt and Nass, 1989; Fligstein, 1990; Haveman, 1993a; Haveman, 1993b; Podolny, 1993). 
More closely related to our international empirical context, researchers have also demonstrated the 
importance of political actors in other countries for the decisions of political actors in a focal country. Strang (1990) 
finds that a supportive 1960 United Nations Declaration had a strong positive impact on the subsequent diffusion of 
decolonization. Membership in International Labor Organization conventions enhances subsequent welfare spending 
(Strang and Chang, 1993) and UNESCO membership increases the probability of founding a formal science 
bureaucracy (Finnemore, 1993). U.S. pressure in the form of trade sanctions stimulated the adoption of intellectual 
property provisions by developing countries (Sell, 1995). Powerful external actors also influence the incidence of 
currency crises (Glick and Rose, 1998), the adoption of policies to protect the environment (Frank, Hironaka, and 
Schofer, 2000a; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer, 2000b) and the adoption of quality certification (Guler, Guillén, and 
Macpherson, 2002). 
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The authors pose as examples of such conditions a lack of consensus on the value of a new 
element of formal structure and the presence of strong opposing coalitions or interest groups, but 
they “do not explore the conditions underlying such resistance” (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).  
We focus on the condition where no such legitimation occurs, and the powerful actor 
coerces the adoption of an emergent regulative institution on the basis of its power alone (Weber, 
1978; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Compared to the emergent regulative institutions that the 
dependent actor adopts of its own accord, the “coerced” emergent institution in this case is less 
likely to make the transition to established institution (i.e., become institutionalized), and 
investors whose activities are governed by this entity are more likely to encounter resistance 
from disaffected interest groups—the primary change agents discussed above—and the 
secondary groups that the primary groups mobilize. 
Inconsistency of institutional attributes.  Oliver (1991) provides the most complete 
treatment of this topic to date, arguing that the degree of an adopting body’s dependence on the 
coercive actor, the strength of legal sanctions for non-compliance, uncertainty in the adopting 
body’s environment, and consistency between the emergent institution and established 
institutions in this environment all determine the likely degree of resistance. Of these attributes, 
the last one—consistency—is especially germane in the current context. The domestic 
policymaking process, when not subject to external coercive influences, typically produces 
emergent institutions whose consequences, procedures and structural type are isomorphic to 
those of established institutions already deemed legitimate. During periods of crisis, however, 
domestic actors are more likely to suppress objections they would otherwise voice in the pursuit 
of an expedient solution (Nelson, 1990; Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; 
Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Williamson, 1993) and defer to the preferences of external actors   8
promising to deliver such a solution. As a result, externally-coerced emergent institutions are less 
likely to be isomorphic to established institutions possessing legitimacy. Indeed, one of the main 
techniques that primary change agents use to mobilize secondary groups against an emergent 
institution is to demonstrate the entity’s inconsistency with established reference points (Henisz 
and Zelner, 2005).  
National identity and legitimate adoption processes.  In addition to the likelihood that a 
coerced regulative structure’s consequences, procedures or structural type will differ from those 
of established institutions, the very process of such an entity’s adoption in response to an 
external organization whose influence derives from its power alone increases its susceptibility to 
change. A large body of research in the field of political sociology emphasizes the power of 
national identity and points to the consistency of a regulative institution’s formation process with 
domestic procedural norms as a key determinant of the institution’s legitimacy, and implicitly its 
survival.
3 In a classic piece on macro-level political regimes, Bendix (1978) notes that the 
modern nation-state derives its legitimacy from the sanction of the people, in contrast to the 
European kings of the sixth through 16th century, who sought to attain legitimacy (and thus 
retain power) through the external sanction of organized religion
4. Bendix argues in particular 
that the extent to which citizens regard the process by which their preferences are aggregated 
into policy as legitimate determines the survival of modern regimes. Thus, the greater the shared 
sense of identity and community among the people of a nation, the greater the stresses and 
                                                 
3 Similar arguments are made at the organizational level by Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal & Hunt (1998) who 
demonstrate the importance of consistency a proposed institutional change with actors’ “cognitive schema or 
perception of their organization’s central and distinctive attributes” (Elsbach and Kramer, 1996: 442) as a pivotal 
factor in determining the level of observed resistance by bank workers to regulatory reform. 
4 Specifically, Bendix (1978) argues that the ability of a monarchy to survive in a given polity depended on 
the king’s ability to use the religious sanction to delegate authority to rule to an aristocracy without losing control 
either to elements of that aristocracy, other kings, or an alliance of both.   9
turbulence its rulers are able to survive (Lipset, 1959).
5 The prevalence of nationalism as an 
organizing force in the modern era (Meyer, et al., 1997) reduces the probability that emergent 
institutions introduced by foreign actors will be deemed legitimate and thus increases the 
resistance that investors operating whose activities are governed by such entities are likely to 
face.  
International coercion and illegitimate adoption processes. At the same time, the 
organizational form of the nation-state faces increasing challenges to its power and authority by 
international political and economic actors (Riain, 2000; Guillén, 2001b). Despite evidence that 
nation-states retain substantial policy autonomy (Garrett, 2000), the scale and scope of 
international economic, political and social pressures that national governments now face is 
substantially greater than in previous decades.
6  
The most concrete and successful manifestation of the globalization of national policy 
environments has occurred among the member states of the European Union (Fligstein and 
Sweet, 2002; Padgett, 2003; Thatcher, 2004). Even in this extreme instance, however, substantial 
national resistance to convergence remains.
7 Several authors highlight that even in the presence 
of common agreement on goals, principles and procedures (Steffek, 2003), the European Union 
(EU) will never enjoy the authority of national governments because (Hansen and Williams, 
                                                 
5 For example, Razi (1987) argues that the fall of the Shah’s regime in Iran was directly attributed to a 
“failure in the area of legitimacy and cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of performance … or class struggle” 
(p. 465). By failing to demonstrate independence from the dominant imperial power of the era (the United States), 
violating Iran’s own Constitution and suppressing long-standing religious norms, the Shah eroded the legitimacy of 
his regime and set the stage for a rapid downfall embraced by almost all segments of the society included those who 
had benefited under his rule. Bienen (1991) tests this logic on a cross-national sample, showing that the prior 
duration of a given political regime is the best predictor of its continued survival suggesting that over time a polity 
develops not only an identification with a national community but also with a given political leadership or regime. 
6 See Guillén (2001a) for a recent interdisciplinary review of the globalization literature. 
7 For example, Busch (2004) chronicles the national heterogeneity in banking regulations that persists even 
in the face of explicit efforts to craft a single European capital market.   10
1999; Horeth, 1999; Laffan, 2001) EU  citizens lack the common identity, shared myths, beliefs 
and history that citizens of an individual country share (Cederman, 2001).
8  
A larger body of related qualitative work on cases other than that of the relatively 
successful European Union similarly emphasizes the importance of national identity and 
“ideational systems… comprised of values, beliefs and symbols” (Dobbin, 1993: 3) for 
understanding the differing responses of individual nation-states to similar external stimuli. 
Studies of the policy responses by France, Great Britain and the United States to the Great 
Depression (Dobbin, 1993), Central European countries’ to pressure for fiscal austerity 
(Campbell, 1996) and Chile, Great Britain, France and Mexico’s to the ascendancy of neoliberal 
economic policies since the 1970s (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002) all conclude that a 
given external stimulus interacting with a nation’s distinct formal and informal national 
institutions can generate radically different national policy outcomes.
9 Spicer, McDermott and 
Kogut (2000) present a related thesis, arguing that the policy goal of efficient reallocation of 
productive assets within an economy, which  may be best accomplished through the financial 
system in well–developed capitalist systems such as the United States, should occur through 
gradualist negotiated public-private bargaining in Central European and post-Communist 
societies. 
The insight that a country’s ideational systems influence the characteristics of the policies 
that it adopts implies that a given externally-coerced policy’s “fit” with a particular country—
                                                 
8 As a result, the crisis of legitimacy that characterizes EU governance and limits policy convergence is not 
a short-term problem that can be addressed at the next ministerial conference but rather a long-term and fundamental 
challenge to the expressed goal in the Treaty of Rome of establishing an “ever closer union.” 
9 Guillén (2001b) extends this logic down to the level of organizations within countries and the 
heterogeneity in practices that managers in Argentina, South Korea and Spain introduced in response to the 
homogeneous pressure of globalization. 
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and thus the policy’s resistance to change—also depends on such systems. Multilateral lenders 
have long recognized this latter point: “…the commitment of the Borrower to implementation 
is… one of the key factors affecting project performance” (Heaver and Israel, 1986:1).
10 Indeed, 
as early as 1959, Per Jacobsson, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, 
asserted that “such programs can only succeed if there is the will to succeed in the countries 
themselves” (James, 1996: 109).
11  
For just as long, however, multilateral lenders and borrowing countries have disagreed on 
the meaning of and best means to encourage local “ownership” of required reforms (Helleiner, 
2000; Boorman, 2001; Boughton, 2003; Khan and Sharma, 2003; Drazen and Isard, 2004; Kikeri 
and Nellis, 2004), debating whether ownership means that either loan recipients “…drive the 
process… [including] the planning, the design, the implementation, the monitoring and the 
evaluation” (Helleiner, 2000: 2) , “do what [lenders] want them to do but… voluntarily” 
(Helleiner, 2000: 2), or something in between.  
To the extent that multilateral lenders are unwilling to abdicate all aspects of program 
management to the borrower out of fear of the inherent conflict between the incentives of lender 
and borrower in the disposition of loan money (Mansuri and Rao, 2004), multilateral lending 
necessarily includes some degree of external coercive pressure. A growing literature on the 
implementation of multilateral policy prescriptions, funded largely by the multilateral institutions 
themselves, acknowledges this pressure and uses economic or political analysis to identify 
mechanisms that might reduce such potential deleterious effects of the incentive conflict—or 
“agency problem”—on policy performance. 
                                                 
10 Quoted in Morrow (1999:1).   
11 Quoted in Boorman (2001)   12
A much larger set of studies offers a normative critique of existing multilateral 
conditionality practices, arguing that the very existence of such a conflict undermines the 
rationale for conditional lending in the first place. In moral terms, writes Buira, conditionality is 
viewed “at best” as a “form of paternalism, by which a country is guided toward its own good, 
rather like a parent or a teacher guides a child, in its own best interests, [while] at worst, 
conditionality implies the imposition on a country of an alien policy agenda that contains 
elements that are not necessary… and may not be in the country’s best interest.” (Buira, 2003). 
Feldstein summarizes the more general moral argument against the practice of conditionality 
with reference to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), writing that: 
“The fundamental issue is the appropriate role for an international agency and its 
technical staff in dealing with sovereign countries that come to it for assistance. It is 
important to remember that the IMF cannot initiate programs but develops a program for 
a member only when that country seeks help. The country is then the IMF’s client or 
patient, but not its ward. The legitimate political institutions of the country should 
determine the nation’s economic structure and the nature of its institutions. A nation’s 
desperate need for short-term financial help does not give the IMF the moral right to 
substitute its technical judgments for the outcome of the national political process (1998: 
27). 
Most recently, Joseph Stiglitz, writing after his experience as a Senior Vice President and later 
Chief Economist of the World Bank, expresses “a concern that the way changes were effected 
undermined democratic processes…” (Stiglitz, 1999: 591).  
In trying to address the issue of why multilateral lenders would impose policies that 
undermine lenders’ socio-political stability and economic ability to repay their loans, a number   13
of contributions to this literature invoke the notion of identity, just as in the political sociology 
literature.
12 Simply put, multilateral lenders are not part of the national political system of the 
lending countries, and exercise their policy influence through a process distinct from the regular 
national policymaking process. Because the resultant policies are inconsistent with other laws or 
statutes, they contravene the powerful psychological forces of identity and nationality, and are 
more vulnerable to resistance efforts (Jasper and Poulsen, 1993).  
On this basis, we propose that emergent institutions whose adoption are more heavily 
influenced by foreign coercive pressures are less likely to be perceived as legitimate, and 
investors whose activities are governed by these entities are more likely to encounter resistance. 
Hypothesis 1: Investors whose activities are governed by an emergent institution whose 
adoption is associated with foreign coercive pressures are more likely to encounter 
resistance. 
3.2  The Aggravating Role of Crises 
The efficacy of the techniques that disaffected interest groups use to influence public 
opinion, and thus increase the resistance faced by investors whose activities are governed by an 
emergent institution, are greater during times of economic crisis. Crises provide powerful images 
that these groups my use as “focusing events” (Kingdon, 1984: 106) to develop (or bolster) an 
“injustice frame” (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982) based on an alleged causal link between 
the emergent institution’s foreign origins and prevailing domestic adverse economic 
                                                 
12 A somewhat related line of critique explored forcefully by (Babb, 2003; Kogut and Macpherson, 2004b; 
Kogut and Spicer, 2004) lies in the professional identity of multilateral lenders in the economics and financial 
sectors. Such professional training and prior experience may pose challenges in accepting the importance of 
institutional context, the psychological power of identity, and the political force of nationalism and fear.   14
conditions.
13 Such a frame serves as an effective tool for enhancing the cohesion of the existing 
coalition and enfranchising secondary groups whose members did not previously regard change 
in the emergent institution as a salient political issue (Andrews, 1997; Hoffman, 1999; Seo and 
Creed, 2002).  
Other actors may assist organized interest groups in their campaign for change during a 
crisis. “Political entrepreneurs” including incumbent politicians, opposition politicians and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) may exploit crisis events in order to boost their own popular 
support (Jones, 1978; Schneider and Teske, 1992; Cox and McCubbins, 1993), especially during 
elections or other periods of political contention. McFarland’s cyclical theory of interest group 
politics (1991) as well as the broader macroeconomic literature on political business cycles, 
which emphasizes how political actors may opportunistically manipulate policy levers under 
their control for the purpose of electoral gain (Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Alesina, 
1989), are both illustrative. Media organizations with their own political agenda may play a role 
as well, especially in enfranchising diffuse, previously unorganized groups (Weingast, 1981; 
Levy and Spiller, 1994). Moreover, economic actors that control resources whose value is 
reduced by the crisis or the policies promoted by multilateral lenders (North, 1990; Landes, 
1998), or who are otherwise adapted to prior circumstances (Ingram, 1998), may also join the 
                                                 
13 An injustice frame uses the contrast between the conditions of one entity (e.g., foreign investors) and 
another (e.g., local consumers) to reinforce citizens’ preexisting notions that the party doing relatively well attained 
its status unfairly or illegitimately. Three injustice frames are particularly relevant for opponents of market-oriented 
reforms whose adopted is heavily influenced by multilateral actors: (1) the contrast between the losses incurred by 
domestic “victims” and the relative well-being of foreign investors insulated by the emergent regulative institution 
(Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982); and (2) the relative lack of initial public debate about the design of the 
emergent institution (Mlcoch, 1998; Kogut and Spicer, 2002); and (3) the accusation that the policymakers in the 
country adopting the market-oriented reform were violating an implicit guarantee of protecting the welfare of its 
population particularly the poor consumers whose prices were frequently substantially increased in an attempt to 
remove economically inefficient cross-subsidization (Krieger, 1963; Berkowitz and McQuaid, 1978; Skocpol and 
Amenta, 1986; Quadagno, 1987). 
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coalition of resistance. Even members of the original coalition supporting the adoption of the 
emergent institution are more likely to defer or compromise if the cost of delayed resolution is 
high and change in the emergent institution—including its elimination—appears to be an 
expedient solution (Nelson, 1990; Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; 
Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Williamson, 1993).     
Crisis conditions thus improve the ability of organized interest groups seeking change in 
an externally-coerced emergent institution to obtain such change. Indeed, the conditions that a 
crisis creates may play the pivotal role in determining whether such a group is able to secure 
major (or punctuated) change rather than incremental (or creeping) change, which is typically 
more common in the policymaking arena (Astley, 1985; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; Jones, 
Baumgartner, and True, 1998).  
Hypothesis 2: Investors whose activities are governed by an emergent institution whose 
adoption is associated with foreign coercive pressures are particularly likely to 
encounter resistance in times of financial or macroeconomic crisis. 
3.3  The Moderating Role of Vintage 
Although investors whose activities are governed by emergent institutions adopted in 
response to external coercive pressures are more likely to face resistance during a crisis, the 
timing of such a disruptive event is uncertain.  Regardless of the other attributes that influence an 
investor’s expected level of resistance, the very persistence of an emergent institution reduces 
resistance as the entity necessarily becomes “retrojected into consciousness in the course of 
[actors’] socialization” (Berger and Luckman, 1967: 60-61)” through the long-term process of 
institutionalization.    16
Hypothesis 3: Investors whose activities are governed by an emergent institution whose 
adoption is associated with foreign coercive pressures are less likely to encounter 
resistance as the vintage of that institution increases.  
3.4  The Moderating Role of Established Political Institutions 
In countries whose formal upper-level political institutions include multiple checks and 
balances, interest groups seeking a wholesale or investor-specific policy revision or reversal 
must secure the agreement of multiple policymakers representing non-overlapping interests. 
Policymakers choose issues to address based not only on the political benefits that they expect to 
enjoy from “solving” an issue through policymaking, but also the “cost” that they must incur in 
terms of the time and effort that such policymaking requires. This cost depends largely on the 
configuration of the formal country-level political institutions—most prominently the internal 
structures of and relationships among the legislature, the executive branch, the judiciary and 
regulatory agencies—that govern the policymaking process (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan, 
1992; Moe and Caldwell, 1994; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996; Andrews, 2001). 
Configurations that increase costs impede change, effectively mitigating interest group pressures 
for change (Tiller and Spiller, 1999; Tsebelis, 2003), while structures that reduce costs facilitate 
change, effectively increasing the potency of such pressures (Witt and Lewin, 2004).  
Analysis of the effects of country-level institutional configurations on the incidence of 
policy change derives from the regulative pillar of neoinstitutional theory, including 
contributions from economic history (North and Weingast, 1989; North, 1990); formal political 
economy models (Dixit, 1996; Laffont, 1999); and qualitative evidence from recent policy shifts 
in infrastructure sectors (Spiller, 1993; Levy and Spiller, 1994) and elsewhere (Weingast and 
Moran, 1983; McNollGast, 1987; Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast, 1989; Gely and Spiller,   17
1990). Such institutions are usefully characterized in terms of checks and balances, including 
both
 de jure characteristics such as constitutional separation of powers as well as de facto 
characteristics such as the extent of partisan heterogeneity within and across branches of 
government. Institutional configurations with stronger checks and balances require agreement 
across a broader range of political actors to affect a shift in policy for a given level of societal 
pressure, increasing the effort required of any given political actor to change an emergent 
institution. In contrast, configurations that concentrate political power in the hands of a single 
actor facilitate change. Empirical evidence demonstrates the effects of institutional veto points 
on policy stability (Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998; Franzese Jr., 1999; Persson and Tabellini, 
1999; Treisman, 2000; Henisz, 2004). 
Hypothesis 4: Investors whose activities are governed by an emergent institution whose 
adoption is associated with foreign coercive pressures are less likely to encounter 
resistance as the strength of the effective checks and balances in the policymaking 
process increases. 
3.5 Investor  Experience 
The conditions discussed above—the extent to which an emergent institution’s adoption 
has been influenced by foreign actors, the emergent institution’s vintage, the occurrence of a 
crisis and the strength of checks and balances—are all reform- and country-level attributes that 
influence the amount of resistance an investor is likely to encounter. However, investors vary in 
their susceptibility to such resistance.  
All organizations confronted with the risk or reality of adverse change in an emergent 
institution face strong pressures to maintain legitimacy by acquiescing to such change (Oliver, 
1991:160-161). Because the enforcement mechanism for emergent institutions is the coercive   18
power of the state (Scott, 2001: 52), the penalties for noncompliance are both tangible and severe 
(Oliver, 1991:168). At the same time, the imposition of a new or modified institution intended to 
meet broader distributional demands significantly restricts an organization’s discretion in key 
decisions such as “resource allocation, product or service selection, resource acquisition or 
organizational administration (i.e., hiring, compensation, promotion)” (Oliver, 1991: 166), and 
more generally chafes against the “technical activities and efficiency demands” (Seo and Creed, 
2002:226) that support profitability. The prospect of substantial economic loss from conformity 
to the external mandates of the state thus creates strong internal pressures for organizations to 
resist change in emergent institutions.  
An organization’s information-based resources and capabilities affect its susceptibility to 
resistance (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). Given the difficulty of assessing complex, evolving 
socio-political conditions, managers that can look to their own past experience for an analogue to 
guide their current search for an organizational response or for accumulated learning (Baum and 
Ingram, 1998; Baum, Li, and Usher, 2000) are better equipped to make sound decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty. For example, Henisz and Delios (2001) find that prior experience in a 
specific country reduces the deterrent effect of cultural or market differences on a firm’s decision 
to invest in the country. Lyles and Steensma argue that as a result of the wide diversity of 
emergent institutions governing infrastructure projects, investors’ management of their 
relationship with the government is an important organizational capability and key “factor of 
success” in such projects (Lyles and Steensma, 1996: 70). 
Hypothesis 5: The resistance encountered by a given investor declines in the experience 
of that investor in the national environment.   19
4 Methods 
4.1 Data 
In order to test our hypotheses, we examine the investment history of 1,001 private 
electricity projects in 75 countries during the period 1989 – 2001. These projects constitute the 
population of global private investment in electricity generation over this time period, as 
compiled by the Hagler-Bailly consultancy. In a small subset of countries (e.g., Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States), a substantial number of private investment projects 
predate our sampling period and are omitted from our analysis. 
We augment the Hagler-Bailly dataset’s information gathered from international, industry 
and local news reports available through various online databases. A large team of research 
assistants compiled this information and used it to code several of the variables described below. 
Validation of the coding of the dependent variable by the authors and a PhD student indicated a 
reliability of greater than 0.98. 
4.2  Unit of Analysis 
Our hypotheses implicate independent variables at the country level (H2 and H4), the 
reform level (H1 and H3), and the investor level (H5). We address these multiple levels of 
analysis with a panel data set whose cross-sectional unit is an investment in a electricity 
generation facility by (a coalition of) investors, which is the most disaggregated of the three 
levels. Our unit of analysis is thus the investor coalition-country-year.  
4.3 Dependent  Variables 
As noted in the Introduction, resistance may manifest either at the level of the investor or 
across the board. Our primary dependent variable is a dichotomous measure equal to one if, in a 
given investing coalition-country-year, there occurs either the former type of event, which we   20
refer to as a dispute and may be initiated by the investor in response to adverse government 
action or in action, or the latter, which we refer to as wholesale policy change. 
Our coding of events is conservative because our measures capture only those policy 
changes and disputes severe enough to warrant press coverage. This biases our coefficient 
estimator downward, reducing the probability of finding a statistically significant relationship. In 
our sensitivity analyses, we also examine the robustness of our results to the disaggregation of 
the dependent variable into its constituent components. 
4.4 Independent  Variables 
Degree of coercion. We measure the degree to which a reform has been “coerced” by the 
World Bank, IMF or other multilateral lenders using results from Henisz, Zelner and Guillén 
(2004), who model the effect of multilateral lending on a country’s adoption of market-oriented 
reforms in electricity generation, taking into account the country’s propensity to borrow from 
multilateral institutions, the adoption decisions of other countries (weighted by their trade with 
the focal country), and a series of relevant domestic political and economic factors. When all 
other variables are held constant at their mean level in 1997, a one standard deviation increase in 
multilateral exposure (net borrowing from multilateral lenders as a percentage of GDP) is 
predicted to generate an 81 percent increase in the probability of a change in market-oriented 
reforms. In the current analysis, we measure the extent to which the emergent institutions 
governing private investment in a country’s electricity sector are coerced by multilateral lenders 
as the difference between the probability that a country would adopt a reform in the year in 
which its reform program began as predicted by (1) a model that omits the role of multilateral 
lenders and (2) a model that includes the role of multilateral lenders. Table 1 lists the countries   21
and the extent to which they were more or less likely to adopt reforms in the fully specified 
model of Henisz, Zelner and Guillén (2004) that includes the role of multilateral lenders. 
Crises. We combine the coding schemes of (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Detragiache and 
Spillimbergo, 2001; Hamann and Prati, 2002; Beers, 2003; Kaminsky, 2003), who collectively 
identify 10 different types of crisis including currency crises, banking crises, stabilization 
episodes and various forms of default, to construct a dichotomous measure of the existence of a 
financial or macroeconomic crisis in a given country in a given year. Table 2 provides a listing of 
the country-years in which a crisis has occurred according to the most inclusive definition.  
Vintage. We create a variable measuring reform vintage that is initially zero for each 
country and increases by one for each additional year following the initiation of electricity sector 
reforms. The initial year of reform is that in which (1) the regulator becomes independent from 
the ministry, or (2) the regulator becomes independent from the state-owned electricity 
generating company, or (3) entry by new private generators for resale to final customers is 
permitted. Table 3 provides a list of the initial reform year for the countries in our sample. 
Checks and balances in established political institutions. Our measure of checks and 
balances is the “Political Constraints Index”, (POLCON) developed by Henisz (2000). 
14 The 
first step in constructing this measure is the identification of the number of independent branches 
of government (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers, judiciary and sub-federal 
institutions) with veto power over policy change in each country. Countries lacking any formal 
veto points are assigned a score of “0.” For all other countries, the majority preference of each of 
these branches and the status quo policy are then assumed to be independently and identically 
                                                 
14 Data and codebook are available from http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/POLCON/ 
ContactInfo.html   22
drawn from a uniform, one-dimensional policy space [0,1]. This assumption allows for the 
derivation of a quantitative measure of institutional constraints using a simple spatial model of 
political interaction. 
This initial measure is then modified to take into account the extent of alignment across 
branches of government using data on the party composition of the executive and legislative 
branches. Alignment across branches increases the feasibility of policy change, thereby reducing 
the level of political constraints. The measure is then further modified to capture the extent of 
preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch. Greater within-branch heterogeneity 
increases (decreases) the costs of overturning policy for aligned (opposed) branches. Possible 
scores for the final measure of political constraints range from zero (least constrained) to one 
(most constrained). 
Countries with the greatest level of veto points in the formal policymaking apparatus are 
those federal states with strong independent judiciaries and either presidential systems or 
proportional representation electoral rules that tend to yield coalition governments, such as the 
United States, Germany and Switzerland. Political constraints decrease as the number of veto 
players declines or as their preferences become more homogeneous, as is the case in moving to a 
mixed Parliamentary-Presidential system, typified by France or Brazil; to heavily fractionalized 
Parliamentary systems like those of Belgium, Israel and the Netherlands; to Westminster 
Parliamentary systems with winner-take-all districts, such as the United Kingdom’s. Non-
democratic countries and those with transitional political regimes have the lowest levels of 
political constraints because the formal institutional structures in these states provide tremendous 
discretion to policymakers. Table 4 provides the average observed value of political constraints 
for each country in our sample.   23
Experience of Investing Coalition. We construct an investor experience measure by 
(1) calculating for each individual investor
15 the cumulative number of years that it has been 
involved in each of its projects for each period, (2) summing each investor’s cumulative 
experience across all projects in a given country for each period, (3) multiplying the resulting 
figure for each investor by its equity stake in a given project, and (4) summing the resulting 
figure for all investors in a given investor coalition. Our investor experience variable is thus an 
equity-weighted measure of the country-specific experience of each investing coalition.  
Other Independent Variables. We also include the per capita income of the country to 
measure a country’s level of economic development. We expect that, independent of our 
arguments about legitimacy, the material interests of consumers and private investors in poorer 
countries are more divergent, leading to a greater incidence of policy changes and disputes. We 
also include a variable measuring the size of a generating facility (in megawatts) to capture its 
visibility or political salience. Both of these variables are logarithmically transformed to take into 
account their extreme skewness. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix. 
4.5 Modeling  Procedure 
We estimate the effects of independent variables on the occurrence of a dispute or 
wholesale policy change using an event history analysis, a technique that assesses the influence 
of a set of covariates on the incidence of an event using a longitudinal record of events in a 
sample from a population. In our model, each investor coalition is at risk of an adverse event in 
each country in which it has a stake in a power plant in each time period or until an adverse event 
occurs. This technique models the rate of a transition from an origin state to a destination state 
                                                 
15 Investor names were carefully screened to eliminate multiple names for the same firm as well as to take 
into account mergers, acquisitions and divestitures. In the latter cases, organizational memory, ties and influence 
were presumed to survive a change in ownership.   24
(adverse event) as a function of the covariates. Our primary specification employs a Weibull 
model: 
β ρ λ ρλ
jt X e t t h = =
− , ) (
1  
where h(t) is the hazard function for a reform to transition from non-adoption to adoption at time 
t, with the observed covariate row vectors Xjt and parameters to be estimated ρ and β (Blossfeld 
and Rohwer, 1995). To take into account the existence of multiple observations (investor 
coalitions) per country, we cluster the standard errors by country.
16 
To address problems of multicollinearity and facilitate the interpretation of the results, we 
mean-centered the constituent variables in our two-way interaction terms. Preliminary data 
analysis uncovered substantial nonlinearities in multiple independent variables across the 
subsamples of crisis and non-crisis years.  
Because our model already includes multiple two-way interaction terms (multilateral 
influence X crisis, multilateral influence X political constraints, and multilateral influence X 
clock), we chose to present the results for the full sample as well as results for the crisis- and  
crisis subsamples rather than grapple with the additional complexity of three-way interaction 
terms. 
5 Results 
5.1  Foreign Coercion and Mediating Variables 
Table 6 displays our results in the full sample (column 1) and the subsamples of crisis 
(column 2) and non-crisis years (column 3).  In all specifications, investors are less likely to 
                                                 
16 Our results are also robust to clustering the standard errors by country-year as well as implementing a 
shared frailty model allowing for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level.   25
encounter resistance in countries with higher levels of per capita income and for investments of 
smaller size.  
In the full sample, we find no baseline support for a positive association between the 
extent to which the adoption of a reform program was influenced by multilateral lenders and 
subsequent resistance (Hypothesis 1). However, we do find a strong positive association between 
multilateral influence on reform adoption and the likelihood of resistance in crisis years (the 
coefficient estimate on the interaction between multilateral influence on reform adoption and 
crisis in column 1 and the coefficient estimate on multilateral influence on reform adoption in 
column 2 are both positive and significant). These results suggest that multilateral influence does 
reduce legitimacy, and thus increase the likelihood that investors will encounter resistance, 
during periods of economic distress, when actors in society are more likely to reevaluate 
emergent institutions (Hypothesis 2). 
The economic significance of these results is noteworthy. When all other variables are 
held constant at their mean level, investors in countries for which the predicted influence of 
multilateral lending is one standard deviation above the mean (e.g., Ecuador and the Dominican 
Republic) and that encountered a financial or macroeconomic crisis exhibit a probability of 
resistance 23 times higher than that for countries in which multilateral lending has no predicted 
influence on reform adoption and there is no macroeconomic or financial crisis. Neither the 
occurrence of a crisis nor a high level of multilateral influence is sufficient to generate a 
predicted increase in resistance in the absence of the other variable. 
The presence of a crisis also strongly affects the remaining negative moderating 
relationships (vintage and political constraints) as well as the negative effect of investor coalition 
experience. In crisis years, the vintage of market-oriented reforms more greatly mitigates the   26
negative relationship between multilateral influence and resistance encountered by investors, 
suggesting that investors in countries with greater multilateral influence on the adoption of 
reforms are less likely to encounter resistance if they enter that country some time after the 
adoption of emergent regulative institutions (Hypothesis 3). Investors who entered a country in 
the year of the adoption of the emergent institutions had a predicted level of resistance 77 percent 
higher than the baseline hazard in crisis years whereas investors who waited for five years after 
the adoption of the emergent institutions experienced a 36 percent decrease in the predicted 
hazard of resistance.  As for non-crisis years, we find a puzzling positive (albeit small in 
economic magnitude) relationship between the vintage of emergent institutions in non-crisis 
years and the probability of resistance faced by investors.  
Turning to the effect of political constraints, we find that investors in countries with more 
developed checks and balances in their established political institutions have a far lower 
predicted level of resistance to reforms whose adoption was more strongly influenced by 
multilateral lending (Hypothesis 4), and that the magnitude of this effect is substantially stronger 
in crisis years than in non-crisis years. Investors that entered countries with political constraints 
one standard deviation below the mean level (e.g., Mali, Pakistan and Tunisia) had a predicted 
hazard of resistance over sixteen times the baseline level in crisis years (320 percent higher in 
non-crisis years), whereas investors that entered countries with political constraints one standard 
deviation above the mean level (e.g., Australia, Belgium and Germany) experienced a 94 percent 
decrease in the predicted hazard of resistance (68 percent in non-crisis years).  
Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 5, we find that investor coalitions with more host 
country experience are less likely to encounter resistance and that this relationship is also much 
stronger in crisis than non-crisis years. Investing coalitions with one standard deviation below   27
the mean level of experience had a predicted hazard of resistance 302 percent higher than the 
baseline in crisis years whereas investors with one standard deviation above the mean level 
enjoyed a 79 percent reduction in predicted hazards. Hazard rate multipliers for these and other 
combinations of the independent variables of theoretical interest are displayed in Table 7. We 
also provide plots of the effects of varying individual independent variables of theoretical 
interest on the predicted annual hazard rate while holding all other variables constant at their 
mean levels for countries experiencing a crisis in Figures 1 - 4. 
As a check on our results, we examine the investment projects with the highest predicted 
probability of resistance in the 1999 – 2001 period that had not yet experienced unilateral policy 
changes or bilateral disputes by 2001, the final year of our sample period. Table 8 displays the 
ten such cases with the highest predicted probability of resistance, along with a brief synopsis of 
their experiences in 2002 – 04. The baseline probability of resistance in our model is 12.4 
percent, and of the ten cases, five exhibited a dispute or wholesale policy change, while another 
three experienced some informal resistance or delay. 
5.2 Sensitivity  Tests 
In order to demonstrate the robustness of our results, we conduct several sensitivity tests. 
First, we disaggregate our dependent variable into its constituent components (unilateral 
government policy changes adverse to investor interests and bilateral disputes between the 
investor and the government). Table 9 depicts these results, which are similar but not identical 
for the two types of events. For example, in the absence of a crisis, foreign coercion has larger 
effect on the probability of a dispute than it does on that of a unilateral policy changes, whereas a 
crisis has a greater aggravating impact on policy changes that it does on disputes. Vintage plays a 
greater moderating role on policy changes and the experience of the investing coalition is only   28
weakly effective in reducing the probability of a dispute. An increase in per capita income level 
reduce the probability of a dispute but not that of a policy change, and political constraints 
increase the probability of disputes in countries that initiate a reform program in the absence of 
foreign coercion. Despite these differences across the two types of events, we still see a positive 
impact of foreign coercion in the presence of a crisis (Hypothesis 2), a moderating role for 
political constraints (Hypothesis 4) and a benefit of experience (Hypothesis 5) in both sets of 
regression results. 
Next, we rotate in additional independent variables that might plausibly be related to 
resistance, but whose inclusion in our primary specification significantly reduces the sample size. 
These include the incidence of change in the political regime of a country, the incidence of 
change in the political leadership of a country, the extent of a country’s democratization, the 
government’s share of national output in a country, the country’s openness (measured using 
either the dichotomous Sachs & Warner (1995) or Wacziarg & Welch (2003) indices), the 
performance of the electricity sector (measured either in terms of output generated or output 
generated and delivered to final customers) and the change in that performance since the 
adoption of the emergent institutions. None of these variables is statistically significant, nor does 
its inclusion alter the support for our hypotheses (results available from the authors upon 
request). 
Finally, we test the sensitivity of your results to our choice of the Weibull functional form 
by estimating the model using exponential, Gompertz, and Cox proportional hazard models. 
Once again, none of these changes has any substantive effect on our core results (results 
available from the authors upon request).   29
6 Discussion 
6.1  Foreign Coercion and the Sustainability of Emergent Institutions 
The empirical phenomenon that we investigate is adoption of emergent regulative 
structures to govern electricity generation in response to the coercive influence of multilateral 
lenders. We argue and find evidence that such coercion is likely to generate domestic resistance, 
particularly in countries with volatile economic environments and established political 
institutions lacking checks and balances.  
Our results also speak to a larger class of phenomena. As the constraint of geography 
weakens due to globalization and technological change, political and economic organizations 
face increasing pressures from external political and economic actors. Multilateral organizations 
pressure countries to adopt reforms, just as competition from afar or demands from a distant 
headquarters pressures local companies to adopt reforms. The impetus for institutional or 
organizational change is thus increasingly distant in terms of identity. Under such conditions, 
coercive influences seeking institutional change, long assumed to possess both power and 
legitimacy, are increasingly likely to lack the latter characteristic. 
Will the sanction of a given policy instrument or institutional characteristic by the 
European Union lead to adoption by member states? What effect will the adoption of a given 
organizational practice by an American firm have on its Japanese or Chinese competitors? What 
about the impact of a given organizational practice’s adoption by an American multinational’s 
headquarters on the company’s Bolivian subsidiary? Our results suggest that in instances in 
which a powerful external actor promotes institutional or organizational change by distant actors, 
resistance to the emergent institution will be a function of (1) local environmental conditions that 
help opponents focus attention on the illegitimacy of the emergent institution (e.g., poor 
economic results in the focal organization that facilitate the scapegoating of the external actor);   30
(2) local decision-making structures that restrict the discretion of local decision-makers (e.g., 
lower functional independence of a local subsidiary from its regional or corporate headquarters); 
(3) vintage, which facilitates institutionalization of the new practice; and (4) characteristics of the 
interest parties that enhance their ability to mobilize or diffuse resistance (e.g., the national 
identity of a local executive or the sophistication of a local lobbyist). 
6.2  Multilateral Lending and the Backlash Against Globalization 
This research also contributes to the scholarly and policy literatures on multilateral 
conditionality, particularly as these literatures relate to the backlash against globalization 
observed in a growing number of developing countries. Prior literature within political sociology 
and comparative political science has examined the resistance to multilateral reforms. The key 
findings from this literature emphasize the role of urbanization and other local environmental 
factors in facilitating the organization of resistance (Walton and Ragin, 1990) , as well as the role 
of political structures that restrict discretionary policy change (MacIntyre, 2001). These studies 
do not exploit variation in the extent of foreign coercion across countries, the subsequent 
evolution of environmental conditions or the characteristics of key actors within these countries. 
In contrast, the policy literature on means to enhance the domestic ownership of multilateral 
reforms emphasizes mechanisms that reduce the illegitimacy of multilateral influence on a 
reform, but pays less attention to the extent to which environmental, political and organizational 
characteristics of the lending countries interact with these mechanisms. Our results suggest a 
need to combine the two perspectives. 
Especially in countries prone to economic or financial crises and lacking checks and 
balances in established political institutions, we find that emergent institutions whose adoption is 
heavily influenced by multilateral actors are almost certain to face resistance. Efforts to enhance   31
local ownership in these contexts, most likely by increasing access by the poor, are necessary. 
While some internal policy studies emphasize the need for a shift in this direction, other authors 
continue to cling to the notion that redistributive deviations from economic efficiency are 
unnecessary or counterproductive. Our results suggest that that such efforts to enhance 
ownership, although potentially costly in the short term, may be necessary for the emergent 
institutions to stand the test of time. In the absence of such efforts, the political resistance that the 
current solutions are generating, despite higher economic efficiency, could lead to their 
dismantling (e.g., the recent renationalization of parts of the Argentine electricity system). 
Resistance could also lead national governments to rally against foreign coercion in general, thus 
undermining multilateral institutions’ ability to secure future institutional change. While 
multilateral actors may have as their goal the implementation of economically efficient policies, 
the enacting and maintenance of these policies is a political act that requires careful attention not 
just to the political incentives of fully rational economic actors, but to the complex interplay of 
cognitive frames, interest group lobbying, formal political structures at the national level, and 
international relations. 
6.3  Limitations and Future Research 
Although we believe that our analysis makes an important contribution, we also 
acknowledge several shortcomings. First, it does not identify the mechanisms that opposed 
interest groups use to rally sympathetic but inactive peers to their cause. Additionally, while our 
results are consistent with the hypotheses that financial or macroeconomic crises enhance the 
efficacy of such groups, the foreign identity of multilateral actors further facilitates these efforts, 
checks and balances in established political institutions moderate these pressures, and investor 
coalitions with substantial host country experience are able to insulate themselves from adverse   32
policy outcomes or potential disputes, future research using comparative cases (e.g., Elsbach 
(1994)) or content analysis of media reports should seek to more closely identify the underlying 
processes at work. Only such micro-level studies can provide concrete operational guidance to 
political and economic actors seeking to enhance the survival of emergent institutions, or to their 
opponents seeking to resist the institutionalization of such changes. 
Our results also do not speak directly to the underlying desirability of the adoption and 
institutionalization of emergent institutions supported by multilateral lenders. Particularly in the 
context of the normative debate surrounding multilateral conditionality, this is an important 
issue. Existing research already demonstrates the efficacy of the deregulation, privatization and 
liberalization of infrastructure services in general (Ros, 1999; Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2000; Fink, 
Mattoo, and Rathindran, 2002; Wallsten, 2002; Jamasb, et al., 2004). However, it is possible that 
this empirical result is an artifact of a selection problem. Early adopters may possess the requisite 
institutional structures that support market-oriented reforms, undertake such reforms independent 
of multilateral influence and subsequently enjoy welfare gains, while later adopters may lack 
supporting institutional structures, undertake reforms in response to multilateral influence and 
subsequently suffer welfare losses. The results obtained by analyzing efficiency among early 
adopters would thus lead to incorrect inferences about the potential gains to remaining countries 
due to the self-selection of countries with supporting institutional structures into the adopting 
sample. Further, even after data are amassed on countries that adopt reforms in response to 
multilateral influence, results obtained by pooling these two groups without distinguishing 
between them would reflect “mean” results, possibly suggesting the efficacy of market-oriented 
reforms and supporting further multilateral coercion if the former group dominates the pooled 
sample. Future research should thus compare sector-specific economic outcomes (e.g., increases   33
in electricity output, decreases in line losses or reductions in concentration of ownership) in 
countries that adopted deregulation, privatization and liberalization indigenously versus as a 
component of a multilateral lending program.   34
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Table 1: Extent of Multilateral Influence on Reform Adoption






























Note: Countries not included above have value of zero.    47
Table 2: Country-Years of Financial or Macroeconomic Crisis
Country Years Country Years
ANTIGUA 1996-01 JAPAN 1991-01
ARGENTINA 1992-93, 1995, 2001 KENYA 1996-01
AUSTRALIA 1992 KOREA 1997-01
BOLIVIA 1994-01 MALAYSIA 1997-01
BRAZIL 1989-99 MEXICO 1994-97
CHILE 1990 NICARAGUA 1996-01
CHINA 1990-99 NORWAY 1990-93, 1998-00
COLOMBIA 1995, 1997-99 PAKISTAN 1998-99
CZECH REPUBLIC 1995-01 PERU 1995-97
DENMARK 1990-93 PHILIPPINES 1990-92, 1997-01
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1990-01 POLAND 1997-99
ECUADOR 1993-01 ROMANIA 1999-01
EL SALVADOR 1995-96 SPAIN 1992-93
FINLAND 1992-94 SRI LANKA 1996
FRANCE 1994-95 SWEDEN 1991-92
GHANA 1997-01 TAIWAN 1995, 1997-98
GUATEMALA 1992-99 TANZANIA 1995-01
GUYANA 1998-99 THAILAND 1997-01
HONDURAS 1993-01 TURKEY 1994, 2000-01
HONG KONG 1998 UK 1990-99
HUNGARY 1995 UKRAINE 1997-00
INDIA 1991, 1993-01 VENEZUELA 1994-98
INDONESIA 1994, 1997-01 VIETNAM 1996-01
ITALY 1990-95 ZIMBABWE 1996-01
JAMAICA 1994-00    48
Table 3: Year of Initial Electricity Reform
Country Year Country Year
Antigua and Barbuda 1975 Japan 1999
Argentina 1991 Kazakhstan 1996
Australia 1996 Kenya 1997
Austria 1999 Korea, Rep. 1966
Bahamas, The 1999 Lao PDR 1998
Bangladesh 1966 Luxembourg 1999
Barbados 1982 Malaysia 1992
Belgium 1999 Mali 1982
Belize 1992 Mexico 1995
Bolivia 1994 Morocco 1972
Brazil 1995 Nepal 1973
Chile 1978 Netherlands 1998
China 1987 New Zealand 1986
Colombia 1992 Nicaragua 1994
Costa Rica 1993 Norway 1991
Cote d'Ivoire 1997 Oman 1967
Croatia 1999 Pakistan 1997
Czech Republic 1992 Panama 1997
Denmark 1961 Peru 1992
Dominica 1997 Philippines 1987
Dominican Republic 1999 Poland 1997
Ecuador 1997 Portugal 1997
El Salvador 1995 Romania 1998
Fiji 1999 Saudi Arabia 1999
Finland 1995 Senegal 1983
France 1999 Singapore 1995
Germany 1999 Spain 1988
Ghana 1997 Sri Lanka 1977
Guatemala 1996 Sweden 1966
Guyana 1969 Tanzania 1999
Honduras 1991 Thailand 1995
Hong Kong, China 1999 Trinidad and Tobago 1994
Hungary 1994 Tunisia 1963
India 1998 Turkey 1997
Indonesia 1999 Ukraine 1980
Ireland 1993 United Arab Emirates 1998
Israel 1996 United Kingdom 1990
Italy 1996 Vietnam 1963
Jamaica 1994 Zimbabwe 1996   49
Table 4: Average Political Constraints (POLCON) Score by Country
Country POLCON Country POLCON
Argentina 0.74 Laos 0.00
Australia 0.86 Luxembourg 0.77
Austria 0.73 Malaysia 0.75
Bangladesh 0.39 Mali 0.24
Belgium 0.89 Mexico 0.37
Bolivia 0.58 Morocco 0.41
Brazil 0.69 Myanmar (Burma) 0.00
Cambodia 0.00 Nepal 0.41
Chile 0.77 Netherlands 0.73
China 0.00 New Zealand 0.75
Colombia 0.40 Nicaragua 0.75
Costa Rica 0.74 Norway 0.77
Croatia 0.42 Oman 0.00
Czech Republic 0.74 Pakistan 0.32
Denmark 0.77 Panama 0.50
Dominican Rep 0.70 Peru 0.43
Ecuador 0.73 Philippines 0.71
Egypt 0.00 Poland 0.72
El Salvador 0.43 Portugal 0.74
Fiji 0.67 Romania 0.73
Finland 0.77 Saudi Arabia 0.00
France 0.73 Senegal 0.44
Germany 0.84 Singapore 0.51
Ghana 0.05 Spain 0.74
Guatemala 0.36 Sri Lanka 0.49
Guyana 0.73 Sweden 0.76
Honduras 0.31 Taiwan 0.73
Hungary 0.76 Tanzania 0.46
India 0.73 Thailand 0.76
Indonesia 0.15 Trinidad 0.86
Ireland 0.75 Tunisia 0.32
Israel 0.78 Turkey 0.76
Italy 0.77 UAE 0.00
Ivory Coast 0.07 Ukraine 0.55
Jamaica 0.18 United Kingdom 0.73
Japan 0.76 Venezuela 0.44
Kazakhstan 0.00 Vietnam 0.00
Kenya 0.60 Zimbabwe 0.51
Korea, South 0.71    50
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Descriptive Statistics
N 6452 6452 6452 6452 6452 6452 6414 6335 6452 6452 6414 6362 6366
Mean 0.124 0.082 0.065 -0.396 -0.090 0.572 -0.042 8.516 0.516 3.241 0.576 8.827 4.893
Std. Dev. 0.330 0.275 0.247 1.399 1.193 4.427 0.246 10.744 0.500 5.500 0.293 0.901 1.410
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 -9.000 -8.603 -7.937 -0.756 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.087 2.303
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 6.000 6.396 27.884 1.858 77.000 1.000 38.000 0.890 10.791 8.510
Correlation Matrix
Dependent Variable: Policy Change or Dispute (1)
Dependent Variable: Policy Change (2) 0.811
Dependent Variable: Dispute (3) 0.691 0.282
Multilateral Influence on Reform Adoption (4) -0.039 -0.052 0.018
Multilateral Influence X Crisis (mean-centered) (5) -0.001 0.001 0.011 0.853
Multilateral Influence X Vintage (mean-centered) (6) -0.034 -0.040 -0.022 -0.309 -0.412
Multilateral Influence X Political Constraints (mean-centered) (7) -0.104 -0.130 -0.051 0.272 0.447 -0.194
Equity-Weighted Host Country Experience of Investor Coalition (8) -0.038 -0.064 -0.001 0.122 0.062 -0.080 0.114
Crisis (9) 0.116 0.109 0.037 -0.125 -0.075 0.030 -0.190 -0.170
Vintage of Emergent Institutions (10) -0.114 -0.126 -0.058 0.080 0.060 0.521 0.043 -0.100 0.079
Political Constraints (11) -0.019 -0.047 -0.044 -0.104 -0.132 0.043 0.320 0.127 0.066 -0.081
Per Capita Gross National Income (logged) (12) -0.187 -0.184 -0.151 0.127 0.086 -0.060 0.039 0.320 -0.332 -0.010 0.530
Megawatts (logged) (13) 0.197 0.176 0.119 -0.040 -0.039 0.026 -0.037 0.017 0.013 0.016 -0.084 0.026    51
Table 6: Econometric Analysis of the Incidence of Policy Changes and Disputes
(1) (2) (3)
Multilateral Influence on Reform Adoption (H1 > 0) 0.084 0.544 -0.251
0.847 0.027 0.158
Multilateral Influence X Crisis (H2 > 0) 0.555
0.002
Multilateral Influence X Vintage (H3 < 0) -0.068 -0.183 0.078
0.421 0.000 0.008
Multilateral Influence X Political Constraints (H4 < 0) -5.799 -6.835 -2.832
0.022 0.001 0.000




Vintage of Emergent Institutions 0.002 -0.046 -0.010
0.959 0.536 0.796
Political Constraints 2.900 2.634 1.808
0.069 0.092 0.082
Per Capita Gross National Income (logged) -0.698 -0.556 -0.873
0.003 0.074 0.009
Megawatts (logged) 0.554 0.560 0.598
0.000 0.000 0.000
Constant -2.651 -3.233 -1.044
0.185 0.182 0.673
ρ (logged) 0.367 0.410 0.378
0.000 0.000 0.000
Sample all crisis non-crisis
Number of Observations 5551 2827 2724
Number of Plants 1001 749 734
Number of Events (dependent variable=1) 187 125 62
Log Likelihood -538.08 -331.56 -183.62    52
Table 7: Hazard Rate Multipliers for High Multilateral-Influence on Reforms at Various
              Levels of Political Constraints, Crisis, Vintage and Investor Experience
Investor Coalition with Low Experience in Host Country
Crisis Year                 Political Constraints                
Mean - 1SD Mean Mean + 1SD
Mean - 1SD 88885.5 5382.2 325.9
vintage Mean 50072.3 3032.0 183.6
Mean + 1SD 31912.5 1932.4 117.0
Non-crisis Year                 Political Constraints                
low Mean high
Mean - 1SD 2.5 0.8 0.2
vintage Mean 3.2 1.0 0.3
Mean + 1SD 3.9 1.2 0.4
Investor Coalition with Mean Experience in Host Country
Crisis Year                 Political Constraints                
low Mean high
Mean - 1SD 29443.1 1782.8 108.0
vintage Mean 16586.3 1004.3 60.8
Mean + 1SD 10571.0 640.1 38.8
Non-crisis Year                 Political Constraints                
low Mean high
Mean - 1SD 2.5 0.8 0.2
vintage Mean 3.2 1.0 0.3
Mean + 1SD 3.9 1.2 0.4
Investor Coalition with High Experience in Host Country
Crisis Year                 Political Constraints                
low Mean high
Mean - 1SD 6068.4 367.5 22.3
vintage Mean 3418.5 207.0 12.5
Mean + 1SD 2178.7 131.9 8.0
Non-crisis Year                 Political Constraints                
low Mean high
Mean - 1SD 2.5 0.8 0.2
vintage Mean 3.2 1.0 0.3
Mean + 1SD 3.9 1.2 0.4    53






operation Notes on any reported resistance
BRAZIL MACHADINHO DAM/ 
SMELTER PROJECT
1996 2003 2001: 1,500 protesters occupy Ministry of Mines and Energy and picket Inter-American Development Bank 
protesting forced resettlement to make way for hydroelectric power facility. Continued regulatory uncertainty 




1998 1998 2002: Suspension and redesign of regulatory reforms after power crisis triggered by 2001 drought; Tractebel 
suspends all new investment in Gerasul.
PHILIPPINES ILIJAN POWER 
PROJECT
1999 2002 2002: Mirant and Philippine government dispute rationale for delay of opening of Ilijan power plant. Mirant claims 
new President's review of all government contracts signed by Estrada led to delay whereas government focuses 
on subsequent technical glitches.
PAKISTAN JIO BAGGA POWER 
PLANT
1995 1998 n/a
THAILAND SIAM POWER 
(SIPCO) /SSP IND. 
ESTATE
1997 ? 2003: Japanese creditors engaged in dispute with Thai courts regarding interpretation of Thai bankruptcy law in 
2000 payment from Siam Strip Mill to Siam Power; allegations that court is favoring Thai over Japanese interests
TURKEY MARMARA POWER 
PLANT
1996 1999 n/a
INDIA ISPAT STEEL 
WORKS 
PROJECT/BHADRAV
1999 2002 Plant still not built due to ongoing disputes over guarantees for payment for electricity from bankrupt or insolvent 
state electricity boards
INDIA VEMBAR LNG 
POWER PLANT
1998 2002 2003: Government fails to implement 1997 agreement raising gas prices to competitive levels leading to lack of 




1995 2000 350 protestors occupy Brazilian headquarters of Tractebel protesting resttlement policies of villagers in dams 
including Ita. Continued regulatory uncertainty combined with a drought that leaves Ita operating at 15% of 
capacity leads to suspension by Tractebl of new projects in 2003.
INDIA KORBA WEST 
POWER PLANT
1999 ? Plant still not built due to ongoing disputes over guarantees for payment for electricity from bankrupt or insolvent 
state electricity boards
   54
Table 9: Econometric Analysis of the Incidence of Policy Changes and Disputes, Disaggregated Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable = Policy Change        Dependent Variable = Dispute
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Multilateral Influence on Reform Adoption (H1 > 0) -0.259 0.651 -0.348 1.468 0.868 0.191
0.541 0.021 0.339 0.020 0.027 0.402
Multilateral Influence X Crisis (H2 > 0) 0.938 -0.506
0.000 0.197
Multilateral Influence X Vintage (H3 < 0) -0.250 -0.286 0.007 0.021 -0.079 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.923 0.639 0.283 0.993
Multilateral Influence X Political Constraints (H4 < 0) -9.078 -9.498 -4.609 -6.773 -7.011 -0.185
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.053 0.020 0.864
Equity-Weighted Host Country Experience of Investor Coalition (H5 < 0) -0.184 -0.195 -0.113 -0.068 -0.139 -0.029
0.013 0.001 0.344 0.094 0.098 0.206
Crisis 0.877 -0.070
0.104 0.849
Vintage of Emergent Institutions -0.133 -0.140 -0.074 0.031 0.016 0.039
0.076 0.119 0.124 0.191 0.772 0.192
Political Constraints 2.583 2.331 2.525 3.777 3.768 0.791
0.095 0.138 0.035 0.008 0.003 0.545
Per Capita Gross National Income (logged) -0.347 -0.279 -0.858 -1.010 -1.116 -0.843
0.256 0.519 0.062 0.000 0.023 0.023
Megawatts (logged) 0.602 0.559 0.747 0.481 0.491 0.477
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010
Constant -6.876 -5.843 -3.160 -0.656 -0.015 -0.676
0.010 0.127 0.428 0.784 0.997 0.794
ٛ (logged) 0.436 0.417 0.462 0.443 0.531 0.423
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sample all crisis non-crisis all crisis non-crisis
Number of Observations 5727 2937 2790 5840 3056 2784
Number of Plants 1001 751 744 1001 770 738
Number of Events (dependent variable=1) 124 86 38 102 68 34
Log Likelihood -337.05 -230.23 -99.9 -347.41 -210.06 -130.38    55
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